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Throughout the world, economists have observed student lack of interest in 
pursuing the study of economics.  Characteristically, the trend in the 
proportion of U.S. bachelor’s degrees awarded in economics has been 
negative since the 1950s, with a steep decline following a relative cyclical 
high in 1988, Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1 




Most recently, however, there is evidence of a turn-around in the 
number of degrees awarded in economics.  Intriguingly, along with this 
recent increase in U.S. degrees awarded in economics, there has been an 
increase in academic economists’ interest in their teaching, Becker (2003, 
forthcoming).  For instance, when the receipt of economics degrees were at 
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a relative high of 2.3 percent of all U.S. bachelor’s degrees awarded in 
1988, only a couple of sessions at the annual meeting of the American 
Economic Association and Allied Social Science Associations were 
devoted to the teaching of economics (Table 1).   
 
TABLE 1 
SESSIONS AT THE ANNUAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
ASSOCIATION AND ALLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION 
MEETINGS 
 



















































































* The annual AEA/ASSA meetings moved from late December to early January in 1992; thus, 
the meeting listed here in 1991 was actually held in December 1990. 
 
At the low point for economics degrees in 1996, when only 1.4 
percent of U.S. bachelor’s degrees were granted in economics, there were 
six AEA/ASSA sessions devoted to teaching economics.  By 2000, U.S. 
bachelor’s degrees in economics had risen slightly to some 1.5 percent of 
all U.S. degrees granted.  Although more current official U.S. Department 
of Education numbers are not available, John Siegfried’s (2004) American 
Economic Association survey data indicates that this increase in economics 
degrees is continuing.  The bottoming out of economics degrees in 1996 
corresponds to the beginning of an explosion to double-digit numbers for 
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sessions devoted to the teaching of economics at the annual meetings in the 
new millennium, where attendance in these sessions on teaching economics 
were also among the highest of all sessions regardless of area of 
specialization. 
The often-heard arguments that there are no incentives for teaching 
and that the quality of teaching does not matter in a student’s choice of a 
course of study appear to be refuted by the revealed preferences of 
academic economists at the annual AEA/ASSA meetings.  Economists 
apparently have finally learned that their teaching is one of the few policy 
levers they control, but that does not necessarily imply that they know what 
is required for good teaching (Becker and Watts, 1996; 2001), or what 
should be taught.  In this article, I again address what is versus what should 
be taught, and the way economics is taught versus how it should be taught 
at the tertiary level. 
 
2.   TEACHING YESTERDAY’S IDEAS 
I recently asked a newly minted Ph.D. candidate for an entry-level 
professorship to explain how she would relate the ideas of equilibria in 
economics science to what students see in the popular press.  She paused 
and said, “Well, supply and demand . . .” I asked how she would respond to 
satirist P. J. O’Rourke’s assertion (in Eat the Rich: A Treatise on 
Economics) that textbook supply and demand graphs do not help much in 
analyzing situations that are found in newspaper headlines?  I do not recall 
getting much of an answer. 
The fact is that many of the things of interest to students and things 
that they see and hear in the popular media do not lend themselves to 
simple textbook supply and demand analysis.  For example, when 
imperfect information leads to the use of price as a measure of quality -- as 
in used-car markets, insurance, and labor markets -- then an equilibrium 
may be characterized by inequality between quantities demanded and 
supplied, and a neat separation of demand and supply curves may not be 
appropriate.  Scarcity of concert tickets may actually increase their 
attractiveness making static demand curve analysis meaningless.  Similarly, 
supply and demand curves are arguably unidentifiable in the case of 
medical and legal services. 
Using the textbook supply and demand graphs, an instructor will have 
problems correctly handling a student who comes in with a quote such as 
this from Michael Collins, a retail partner at Bain&Co. in Chicago: 
“Making the 1,000
th DVD player is a lot more efficient and less 
expensive than making the first, and that’s reflected in the lower 
price. The difference between the manufacturing cost of the 1 
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millionth and the 2 millionth is miniscule.” (El Boghdady and 
Musgrove, 2003, E2) 
Traditional discussions of supply curves are problematic when marginal 
costs are approximately zero, as is the case for many information-based 
goods with which students are familiar.  The identification of supply and 
demand shifts are further complicated when demand for a product depends 
in part on its widespread usage. 
Students do need to learn about supply and demand, but they also 
need confirmation that textbook-style competitive markets with demand 
and supply curves that might work for agricultural commodities, at least in 
an idealized world, do not work for all items of interest to them.  They need 
to know about the principle of comparative advantage, but they also need to 
learn the difference between static and dynamic analyses
2 and how risk is 
defined and reduced through diversification, not specialization
3. 
                                                 
2  David Ricardo advanced the idea of comparative advantage two hundred years 
ago.  It requires that the production technologies and resources of the trading 
partners remain in place – for example, one parcel of land is fixed and owned by 
one country while another piece of land is fixed and owned by another country.  
Unlike climate and geography, in today’s world both capital and technology are 
not fixed; they can quickly be moved from one country to another.  As a result, 
even if the US has an advantage in the electronic processing of insurance forms 
today, that technology (as well as related technologies as we have seen) can 
quickly be moved to India for even greater cost savings.  To say that the US has a 
comparative advantage in processing forms requires the assumption that this 
technology is fixed to the US, which through TV and Web surfing students see to 
be nonsense.  The assumed static world of Ricardo versus the dynamics of 
technological change cannot be ignored. 
3  Students see articles such as that in Business Week “The Nitty-Gritty: How To Do 
the Math” (January 17, 2000, p. 110), which stated “Happily, about 96% of any 
one company’s risk can be eliminated simply by owning a diversified portfolio ...” 
Such headlines can be used to ask students why employees of a company would 
be wise not to own stock in that company, or why career specialization is risky?  
Using hypothetical data the importance of diversification can be driven home in a 
computer lab using Microsoft Excel.  For example, assuming net returns to $100 
invested in A, B or C are normally distributed, we see that the probability of 
losing principal in the diversified portfolio C is less than the other two (0.0000134 
versus 0.000429 or 0.00298).  This lower risk is also reflected in the smaller 
coefficient of variation for C.  
  A  B  C = .5A+.5B
E(Net Return)  $10.00  $11.00  $10.50 
St. Dev.  $3.00  $4.00  $2.50 
Coef. of Var.  0.3  0.363636 0.238095 
P(N.R.<0)= 0.000429  0.00298  1.34E-05 
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I argued in Becker, Greene and Rosen (1990) that some basic skills 
may have a high value at one point in time and little value at another; for 
example, the ability to manipulate a slide rule fell in value with the 
availability of the inexpensive hand calculator; the ability to manipulate the 
hand held calculator fell in value with the advancement of computer 
spreadsheets and statistical packages.  Since writing with Greene and 
Rosen, the development of online search engines has made library card 
catalog skills obsolete.  So, too, in economics: skills become dated.  The 
advent of the modern-day computer, for instance, has turned economics 
into a more empirical subject, as seen in the work of recent recipients of the 
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science.  Yet, the typical 
undergraduate curriculum gives little attention to the importance of 
empirical research and empirical findings. 
Innovations in the science of economics are not making their way into 
the teaching of economics at the undergraduate level.  For example, 
although Nobel prizes are typically awarded for work completed years 
earlier, and Zahka (1999) describes how the Nobel Laureates’ acceptance 
speeches can be used in teaching the principles of economics, the work of 
Nobel Laureates is not presented regularly in principles textbooks prior to 
announcement of the award and even seldom afterward.  At my request, 
James Murray checked the indexes of macroeconomics editions of Ekelund 
and Tollison (2000), Mankiw (2001), Samuelson and Nordhaus (2003), 
Case and Fair (2002), Schiller (2003), and microeconomics editions of 
Bade and Parkin (2001), Mankiw (2001), Samuelson and Nordhaus (2001), 
Baumol and Blinder (2003), Schiller (2003) and Gwartney, Stroup, Sobel, 
and Macpherson (2003) for prior reference to these recent Nobel Laureates: 
Daniel Kahneman, for having integrated insights from psychological 
research into economic science, especially concerning human 
judgment and decision-making under uncertainty. 
Vernon Smith, for having established laboratory experiments as a tool 
in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alternative 
market mechanisms. 
George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz, for their 
analyses of markets with asymmetric information. 
James Heckman, for his development of theory and methods for 
analyzing selective samples. 
Daniel McFadden, for his development of theory and methods for 
analyzing discrete choice. 
He reported finding only a reference to Smith in Gwartney, et al. (2003).  
My cursory check of more recent editions of principles textbooks likewise 
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found no reference to the 2003 recipients of the Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economic Science: 
Robert F. Engle, for methods of analyzing economic time series with 
time-varying volatility. 
Clive W. J. Granger, for methods of analyzing economic time series 
with common trends. 
With the exception of theoretical work on screening and signaling and 
the role of asymmetric information in markets, the recognized work of 
these Noble Laureates was empirical research, with specific data issues 
driving theory. 
A learned professor with well-refined classroom notes might argue 
that the works of Nobel Laureates, and certainly the dynamic process of 
time-series analysis, are beyond the grasp of the typical 18- to 20-year old, 
and their parents to be sure.  However, students are aware of the idea of the 
complex dynamics of chaos theory from movies such as the schizophrenic 
thriller “π ”, where Max says, “If you graph the numbers of any system, 
patterns emerge; therefore, there are patterns everywhere in nature . . . So 
what about the stock market?  A universe of numbers that represents the 
global economy . . .”  A similar theme appears in Tom Stoppard’s play, 
Arcadia, and an anthology by Watts (2003) provides nearly a hundred 
passages from both classic and contemporary literature and drama dealing 
with a wide range of economic concepts and issues, including a reading 
from Arcadia.  Contemporary movies like “π ” and plays like Arcadia can 
engage the general movie and theater-going population with current 
economic ideas.  
For example, following the showing of Max’s clip from “π ,” 
macroeconomics students who have had some exposure to probability 
theory can be challenged by Mathews’ (2000, pp. 242-246) “urn activities” 
to show the “Polya process” in which multiple equilibria result from a 
stochastic time process involving the sequential drawing and replacing of 
balls based on a stochastic decision rule.  Mathews (2001) places the 
importance of this classroom experiment in an economic context through 
examples drawn from history. 
Learned professors accustomed to only chalk and talk teaching 
methods might also ague that the idea of a Pareto equilibrium is a 
theoretical concept not to be observed in the real world.  But, again, turning 
to the movies, consider the blonde-in-the-bar clip from “A Beautiful 
Mind.”  I have used this clip as a motivational tool to establish the 
connection between Adam Smith’s invisible hand and John Nash’s 
recognition of the role of cooperation with heterogeneous student bodies 
consisting of both entry-level university students and advanced graduate 




4  I sandwich this clip between Charles Holt’s (1996) trading-pit 
simulation (in which a Smithian equilibrium results from students pursuing 
their individual self-interest as demanders and suppliers) and Pickhardt’s 
extension of Holt and Laury’s (1997) classroom simulation in which a less 
than optimum noncooperative equilibrium tends to dominate a Nash 
cooperative equilibrium, which is the Pareto optimum. 
 
3.  TEACHING BEYOND THE TEXTBOOK 
Colander (2004) tells how he entered into textbook writing with an 
ambition to change the way economics is taught, with among other things 
an emphasis on complexity and dynamic processes.  To market books he 
describes how he was led by reviewers and editors to follow the standard 
static framework of market clearing prices and AS/AD.  He states that 
instructors must recognize that textbooks do not represent what the author 
knows or believes:  
“a text(book) is not a direct expression of what the author believes, 
but instead a combination of a much more complicated set of 
considerations in which inertia and processes, not intellectual or 
even pedagogical validity, play the central roles . . . users of the 
books should be aware that that’s what principles of economics 
textbooks are, and structure their teaching accordingly, adding 
context to the discussion whenever possible.”  
It is the instructor’s job to bring his or her class up-to-date on current 
thinking and debate going on in the science of economics.  
For example, even many intermediate and advanced economics 
textbook authors present without question the tenets of expected utility 
theory, even though the work of Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky demonstrates that decision-makers have trouble with the 
concept of probability and the valuation of expected gains and losses.  The 
Allais paradox (which is named after Maurice Allais, the 1988 Nobel Prize 
in economics recipient) can be used to demonstrate the trouble folks have 
ordering uncertain prospects in a way that is independent of irrelevant 
alternatives – a critical postulate for von Neumann-Morgenstern expected 
utility theory.  
                                                 
4  Anderson and Engers (2002) correctly point out that the Nash equilibrium 
portrayed in the movie (all the men including Nash ignore the blonde) is not a 
sustainable equilibrium because given the strategies of the others Nash himself 
could score by going for the blonde – as pointed out by one of his male friends in 
the bar.  Given sufficient desirability of the blond, no heterosexual male will be 
willing to let her walk, unescorted, so any one of them could expect to score given 
the strategy of the other males.   
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In the 1970s, Tversky and Kahneman set out to construct a theory to 
explain the Allais paradox.  The Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) involves 
behavior that contradicts the independence axiom and linear probability 
calculations in expected utility theory.  It can be demonstrated in the first 
week of an introductory economics class by asking each student to consider 
two situations (A and B), each involving a choice between two gambles:  
Situation A: Which do you choose - Gamble A1 or A2? 
Gamble A1 promises a sure win of $30;   
Gamble A2 is a 80% chance to win $45 and 20% chance of $0. 
Situation B: Which do you choose – Gamble B1 or B2?  
Gamble B1 promises a 25% chance of winning $30,  
Gamble B2 is a 20% chance to win $45.  
Situation B differs from situation A only in that one-quarter of the 
original probability of winning a positive amount can be realized. Yet, the 
majority of students typically will prefer A1 to A2 and prefer B2 to B1.  
Thus, the paradox is demonstrated by actually engaging the students in the 
choice process.   
A  von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and the implied 
preference reversal of the Allais paradox can be demonstrated by asking 
each student who said that A1 is preferred to A2 and B2 is preferred to B1 
to assign utility values to the two basic outcome of wining $45 or nothing 
and then to state the implied utility limits for $30.  For example, a student 
who says u(0) = 0 and  u(45) = 1.00 is  implying that  u(30) = v, for 0 < v < 
1.  Expected utility can now be introduced as the sum of utility outcomes 
weighted by their respective probabilities: 
Gamble A1 promises a sure win of $30, so EU = 1.0(v) + 0(0) = v 
Gamble A2 is a 80% chance to win $45, so  EU = 0.8(1) + .2(0) = 0.8 
If A1 is preferred to A2, then v > 0.8 
Lottery  B1 promises a 25% chance of winning $30, so 
EU=0.25(v)+.75(0)=0.25v 
Lottery B2 is a 20% chance to win $45, so EU=0.2(1)+.8(0)=0.20 
If B2 is preferred to B1, then v<0.8 
Kahneman states that the apparent contradiction in this implied utility 
is not a demonstration of stupidity but a much more interesting issue: the 
susceptibility to erroneous intuitions about uncertainty and probability.   
Allais's problem is a demonstration that the subjective response to 
probability is not necessarily linear.  The difference between probabilities 
of 0.25 and 0.35 in decision-making is not as relevant as the difference 
between 0 and 0.10, or between .90 and 1.00.  Furthermore, via questioning 
of students in the classroom, what Kahneman and Tversky (1979) call 
“reflection” and “loss aversion” can be demonstrated: changing the signs of 
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all outcomes in a pair of gambles almost always caused the preference to 
change from risk averse to risk seeking, or vice versa.  For example, the 
majority of students in a class typically preferred a sure gain of $900 to a .9 
probability of gaining $1,000 (or nothing), but they preferred a gamble with 
a .9 probability of losing $1,000 over a sure loss of $900.  
One of the insights that Kahneman and Tversky had was that choice 
problems are usually described in terms of gains and losses, but the utility 
functions that were supposed to explain the choices were defined in terms 
of absolute levels.  Similar to Harry Markowitz, who won the Nobel Prize 
in economics in 1990, they decided to adopt changes and/or differences as 
the sources of utility, which provided the foundation for their “prospect 
theory,” as used in “behavioral economics” today.  Prospect theory replaces 
the notion of "utility" with "value," which is defined in terms of gains and 
losses as deviations from a reference point.  The value function for losses is 
convex and relatively steep, but for gains, it is concave and not quite so 
steep.  In addition, Kahneman and Tversky replaced the probability factor 
for each preference with a subjective "decision weight" that tends to 
overweight small probabilities and underweight moderate and high 
probabilities.
5    
I hear those instructors employing traditional textbook economics 
saying: “students will not understand these calculations!”  To those 
instructors, I ask: what do you think they are teaching in psychology?   
 
4.   ENOUGH! CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
I could go on with additional ways in which the contributions of the Nobel 
Laureates in economics can be used to bring more current thinking into the 
classroom.  An instructor does not have to endorse dynamic analysis, 
complexity, prospect theory, the more general theories of bounded 
rationality, or dwell into the intricacies of probability theory in decision-
making, but those teaching economics today can no longer ignore this work 
even if the textbooks do with their dated list of economic ideas and 
concepts.   
Surfing the Web, students will find less than favorable critiques of 
such simplicity – for example, Yoram Bauman puts the boot into Mankiw’s 
ten principles of economics at  
                                                 
5   For a review of alternative decision theories see Starmer (2000).  “Can people 
learn to be as rational as economic theory supposes”, The Economist (Aug 30 – 
Sept 5, 2003, p. 56), provides an excellent discussion of some of the research 
supporting behaviouralists’ views versus the newer research (by John List, 2003) 
supporting neoclassical theory, that even introductory students can understand. 
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<http://www.improb.com/airchives/paperair/volume9/v9i2/mankiw.ht
ml>.  They will find Avinash Dixit’s proposal and demonstration of how 
game theory can be taught before or as an alternative to the traditional 
introductory economics course, at  
<http://www.princeton.edu/~dixitak/home/AdelaideConf.doc>.   
They will find entire journals devoted to showing the fragility of 
simplistic textbook economics – e.g., the online Post-Autistic Economics 
Review started by the French students’ protest against neoclassical 
economics  
<http://www.paecon.net>.  A trip to the library will uncover Steve 
Keen’s (2002) controversial book Debunking Economics: The Naked 
Emperor of the Social Sciences, which could have been more accurately 
titled Debunking Textbook Economics.   
Keen also maintains an extensive Website at http://www.debunking-
economics.com, as do other controversial liberal and conservative 
academic economists, such as Brad DeLong, at University of California 
Berkeley, http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/movable_type/ or Tyler Cowen 
and Alex Taborrok, at George Mason University, 
http://www.marginalrevolution.com.  The Internet has become the easiest 
way for students to get up-to-date data, headlines, commentary and 
academics’ views on the economy and current events.  They are no longer 
constrained to what is in textbooks. 
An economist might rightfully ask why academic economists are not 
already bringing this work into their classrooms if it is desired?  In the case 
of probability and decision-making, Christopher Sims (2001, p. 53) states 
that few economists have been taught - and thus they have not given 
thought to - the differences and similarities among different definitions of 
probability, chance and risk and how people behave when confronted with 
ambiguity and uncertainty.  In the case of teaching techniques, it may be 
that academic economists do not know what activities are available to teach 
these new ideas since they have never seen them in practice in the teaching 
of economics.  As Gail Hoyt (2003) states, possibly academic economists 
have not embraced these new ideas and teaching methods because they are 
experience goods: anticipated high start-up costs keep risk-adverse 
economists from trying them.   
Regardless of the reason for lack of innovation in teaching, ideas in 
the science of economics no matter how engrained in tradition must be 
questioned and tested.  As a social science, economics is issue oriented and 
thus ridden with conflict.  The dumbing down of economics to the 
dogmatic preaching of a few simple concepts, principles, and axioms of old 
misses the excitement of modern day economics.  The power of economics 
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can be shown at the tertiary level by instructors updating their lists of 
concepts, abandoning their reliance on chalk and talk type teaching 
methods, and changing their examples to reflect current social and political 
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